Operational Concept Plan 2 Military Intervention in Somalia. by Cuny, Frederic C.
/  I
$0/ /</ri
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT PLAN 2 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
BY
Frederick C. Cuny 
INTERTECT
(This paper was prepared for the National Security Council at the 
joint request of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
and the Center for Naval Analysis. The opinions expressed are 
those of the author and do not necessarilly reflect the views of 
the Carnegie Endowment or the C N A 5 neither of which take 
positions on such matters.)
21 November 1992
1
OPSCON 2 (Preliminary) 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA
b y  iFrederick C. Cuny
1 . Operational concept: A US-led international force would
enter the heart of the famine zone, establish either a 
series of safe havens in which the relief agencies and UN 
could operate safely without escorts and a larger exclusion 
zone from which armed vehicles would be prohibited. The 
zone would be monitored by JSTARS and TARPS and patrolled by 
armed helicopters. Rapid response teams would be based in 
the forward areas to respond to any threats to personnel, 
military or civil relief workers, in the safe haven. The 
safe havens would be supplied by air and from the sea.
While the actual operating area for ground forces would be 
relatively small, using a combination of the exclusion zone 
and demarches to the faction leaders not to interfere with 
allied or UN operations would permit us to influence events 
beyond the haven and exclusion zone. The allies would make 
it clear that operation would be strictly humanitarian and 
that as long as the factions did not interfere, they would 
not be harmed. The duration of the mission would be short 
term, no longer than the beginning of the next rainy season 
(mid-March) and an approximate withdrawal date would be 
announced in advance. Turnover would be to a UN force.
2. The objectives:
a) Provide security so that relief agencies can do their 
j o b .
b) Break the back of the famine and stop the deaths.
c) Create an environment conducive to drawing the people 
back to the land.
d) Create sufficient security that refugees in Kenya are 
drawn back to Somalia.
The author is President of INTERTECT Relief and 
Reconstruction Corporation, an Associate of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, and lecturer on Peacekeeping and 
Humanitarian Operations at the UN Force Commanders Course in 
Ni i nsalo, Fi nland.
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3. Force Structure:
Amphibious Force:
The operation would be spearheaded by a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit operating off the coast. The Marines would land from 
an LHA supported by AV-8Bs and AH-1Js. They would secure 
bases ashore including a primary port and one or more 
airports inland in the heart of the famine zone. The 
operation should be structured so that terminals at each end 
of two MSRs are secured.
Main security force:
Once the air and beachheads are secure, the main security 
force would be landed by ship and plane. A force of brigade 
to possibly division strength would be drawn from US Army 
light infantry or airborne forces: (101st AirMobile, 82nd 
Airborne, 325 Inf. or 7th Inf.) and if necessary supported 
offshore by a MEB. If the city of Mogadishu is included in 
the security zone, elements of an armored division will also 
be needed (2nd ACR) with tanks, IFVs, and A P C s .
Supporting elements:
Army support elements should 
2 MP Battalions;
i nclude:
2 CA companies
1 engineering battalion (with tracks); 
1 transportation company;
Associated supply and logistics units. 
Liaison Units:
1 HQ support unit;
One ANGLICA 
Ai r Support:
Rotary wi n g :
In addition to the 24 helicopters attached to the MEU: 
-- 2 US Army helicopter companies of UH-60s,
-- 1 helicopter company of CH-47s,
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1 detachment of USAF CH-53D Pave Coi ns
-- 1 company of AH-6 Apaches 
Fixed wing:
-- 5 C-5s or 12 C-141s 
-- 15 C - 130s 
Naval task force:
A naval task force assembled around the PhibRons supporting 
the MEU and MEB would be reinforced from the Naval Transport 
Command and would supply the force ashore and deliver 
repli ni shments.
Depending on the security situation, it may be advisable to 
station a CV with supporting elements over the horizon.
Special missions:
The SOCCENT SF HRT should remain on station ex Mombasa. In 
addition, 1 Marine HRT/Recon Unit should remain off-shore ex 
Mogadishu throughout the operation.
4. Security zones: The intervention should establish a series
of airtight safe zones in which the relief agencies can work 
freely and an interlocking exclusion zone where they can 
travel with minimal risk. Unescorted convoys should be able 
to transit the exclusion zone without risk. The zones 
should encompass sufficient area that relief agencies can 
deliver seeds and agricultural inputs without risk and 
Somali herdsmen should be able to move their livestock 
without fear of attack.
The heart of the famine area is the area around Baidoa. At 
a minimum, the zone should include: Baidoa, Houddur, Wajit, 
Belet Weyne and the areas surrounding them plus a seaport.
The area should not include the areas west of the Juba 
River. That area can be reached via cross-border operations 
from Kenya and once the zone is established, effective 
control can be established via a limited exclusion zone.
5. Exclusion zones: All attacks on food convoys, warehouses,
and relief agency compounds have been carried out by men 
using "technicals" (four-wheel drive vehicles or pick-up 
trucks mounted with machine guns or recoilless rifles).
This is the key to their mobility. Restrict them from the 
area and it would be very difficult for the bandits or
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factions to operate. In the rural areas, there a r e n ’t that 
many vehicles moving about. Furthermore, the technicals 
have heat and acoustical signatures that would be easy to 
fingerprint with JSTARS.
6. Ports: The operation will need at least one port.
Unfortunately, the best harbors are at Mogadishu and 
Kismayo, both of which should be avoided. Brava and Marca 
are being used by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) using lighters and a barge and cable 
arrangement to ferry the supplies ashore. However, 
amphibious landing craft of the type carried by a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit's (MEU) PhibRon would have no problems in 
either port. Brava is first choice.
7. International composition of the force: The US must have 
participation from some allies. This makes it easier for the 
UN and relief agencies to work with the military force, 
gives the operation more legitimacy internationally, and 
facilitates the hand-over to a UN peacekeeping force. It may 
be possible to ask the countries that have agreed to commit 
troops to the UN but have not yet sent them to join the 
allied force.
A resolution from the UN Security Council similar to the one 
for northern Iraq will be required.
8. Total force: The total force should be large enough to do 
the job but small enough to demonstrate that it is a 
humanitarian operation defending the NGOs and making it 
possible for them to operate. As in northern Iraq, the area 
that we can influence will extend beyond the area that is 
actually secured.
A force composed of a MEU (1800-2100 Marines), two infantry 
brigades (7,500 soldiers), and armored regiment (4,500), 
support elements (3,500). aviation units (2,500) plus 
associated allied troops2^ could accomplish the task. Total 
on-the-ground US troop commitment would be approximately 
20,000 soldiers and Marines.
9. Security for relief agencies prior to execution: Since the
US forces will be seeking a resolution of the Security 
Council to intervene in Somalia, armed factions and bandits 
will have prior notice of the operation. Some faction 
leaders may try to oppose the intervention and independent
n
If Mogadishu is included in the plans, we should encourage 
the British to commit an experienced force ex Northern Ireland to 
manage the irregular urban warfare threat.
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bandit groups will certainly try to steal as much as they 
can before the troops land. Thus, it will be necessary to 
guarantee safety for relief personnel in Mogadishu and 
outlying towns in advance of the landing. This can be 
accomplished in two ways: 1) a demarche to the faction 
leaders ordering them to protect the agencies and holding 
them responsible for any harm, and 2) deployment of UN 
peacekeeping forces around relief agency compounds 48 hours 
before execution. In addition, the SF HRT and the USMC 
Recon/HRT should be deployed close to the main operating 
areas of Mogadishu and Baidoa.
10. Timing: If this concept is adopted, CENTCOM could initiate
detailed planning for a deployment within two weeks.
Assuming that 1) a decision can be made by the national 
command authority before Thanksgiving and 2) that the UN 
will act within one week of a presidential offer if forces, 
and 3) that there will be no significant opposition from 
Security Council members, and 4) that Congressional leaders 
can be notified and briefed during the UN SC debates; 
deployment according to this concept could begin as soon as 
December 7.
11. Threat Analysis: As with any irregular force, the threat is
difficult to predict. Faction leaders do not have absolute 
control over the elements within their AOs and many bandits 
operate independently. The key to controlling both the 
factions and the bandits is by restricting their mobility: 
eliminate the "technicals" and they cannot steal large 
quantities of relief supplies.
The most troublesome element is the likelihood of sniping. 
There will undoubtedly be some individuals and possibly 
groups who will find cause to fire upon US or allied troops. 
The terrain outside the city is not suitable for ambushes 
nor sniping; it is flat and open. The most likely place for 
sniping will be Mogadishu since it alone offers concealment 
and escape possibilities. For this reason, it is strongly 
recommended that US and allied forces stay out of the city 
(the reasoning was explained earlier in OpsCon 1).^
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See also the after action report on the Indian 
Force's experience in Jaffna, Sri Lanka in 1987.
Peace-Keepi ng
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